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DISBURSEMENT OF INSURANCE MONEY
COVERING AN INSURED'S LEGAL EXPENSES
AS INCURRED

I.

Introduction

Directors' and officers' liability insurance (D & 0 insurance)
provides coverage for costs incurred by a director or officer in

defending a third-party claim.' Because directors and officers 2 stand4
in a fiduciary relationship' to their corporation and its shareholders,
they may be held personally liable if they fail to perform their duties
with due care and financial damage to the corporation results. 5
Moreover, litigation costs can be enormous 6 and lawsuits can last

1. See Goldstein & Gordon, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, FOR
DEF. 2 (Aug. 1987) [hereinafter Goldstein & Gordon]; Johnston, Corporate
Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW.
1993, 2013, 2015-16 (1978) [hereinafter Johnston]; Oettle & Howard, D & 0
Insurance: Judicially Transforminga "Duty to Pay" Policy into a "Duty to Defend"
Policy, 22 TORT AND INs. L.J. 337, 337 (1987) [hereinafter Oettle & Howard];
Comment, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' Liability InsuranceAllocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L. REV.
690, 690 (1985) [hereinafter Practical Aspects].
2. For the purposes of this Note, the term director(s) is used to mean director(s)
or officer(s) or both.
3. "Fiduciary relationship" has been defined in the following manner:
One is said to act in a "fiduciary capacity" . . . when the business which
he transacts, or the money or property which he handles, is not his own
or for his own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as to whom
he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and
trust on the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979).
4. "The relation of an officer of a corporation to it is fiduciary, and he must
at all times act in good faith and unselfishly toward the corporation." Jacobson
v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 162, 76 N.E. 1075, 1078 (1906); see also
Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 568, 473 N.E.2d 19, 25, 483
N.Y.S.2d 667, 673 (1984); Fe Bland v. Two Trees Mgmt. Co., 125 Misc. 2d 111,
116, 479 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127, aff'd, 109 A.D.2d 1110, 487 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't
1985).
5. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2.
6. See id.; Johnston, supra note 1, at 1993; Practical Aspects, supra note 1,
at 709.
THE
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for indeterminate periods of time. 7 An institution will, therefore,
often purchase D & 0 insurance' to alleviate the financial risk of
crippling defense costs to its directors 9 in instances where they may
not be indemnified by the institution.10
D & 0 insurance is a relatively new form of liability coverage. 1'
Although D & 0 policies were first marketed in the 1950's, they
2
received scant attention from commentators until the mid-1960's.
Lloyd's of London, the well known British insurance giant, 3 dominated the D & 0 insurance market until the late 1960's.1 4 Today,
several American companies in addition to Lloyd's offer D & 0
insurance coverage, 5 although the number of insurers willing to offer
6
it has decreased in recent years.'
Unlike most other liability insurance, D & 0 insurance does not
require the insurer to assume the insured's defense; 7 rather, it imposes
upon the insurer a duty to pay the insured's defense costs.'" Although

7. See Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1468 (W.D. Pa.
1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987); PracticalAspects, supra note 1, at 694.
8. A corporation may itself indemnify its directors for some forms of liability,
but state statutes strictly regulate areas of allowable coverage. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 726 (McKinney & West Supp. 1987). The corporation may, therefore, opt
to purchase insurance from outside sources. Then when a director seeks to finance
his legal defense, he either approaches his corporation (for "advances") or its
insurance carrier (for "interim payments"). See Practical Aspects, supra note 1,
at 709.
9. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1461.
10. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 2004. New York Business Corporation Law
§ 726 empowers corporations to purchase D & 0 insurance for several purposes:
(1) to indemnify the corporation for its obligation to indemnify directors and
officers; (2) to indemnify directors and officers where the corporation permits their
indemnification; and (3) to indemnify directors and officers in instances where the
corporation fails to indemnify them. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 726 (McKinney &
West Supp. 1987). This Note concerns D & 0 insurance under categories 2 and
3.
11. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 2012.
12. See id.; Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 648, 648 (1967) [hereinafter Corporate Executives].
13. F. WORSLEY & G. GRIFFITH, THE ROMANCE OF LLOYD'S 13-14 (1932).
14. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 2012.
15. See id. (citing Brockmeier, Status of D & 0 Liability Coverage, RISK MGMT.
MAO. 20 (Jan. 1977)); see also Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Education,
302 Md. 516, 529, 489 A.2d 536, 542 (1985).
16. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2.
17. See id.; Johnston, supra note 1, at 2023; Oettle & Howard, supra note 1,
at 339.

18. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2; Johnston, supra note 1, at
2023; Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 339; D. DEY & S. RAY, ANNOTATED
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY 53 (Defense Research Institute, Inc. 1984) [hereinafter LIABILITY INSURANCE]. In the typical D & 0 policy
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most D & 0 insurance provisions are standardized, 19 courts differ
as to when the insurer must disburse these payments. 2° Specifically,
there is a dispute concerning whether the standard D & 0 insurance
policy2' requires the insurer to pay the insured's defense costs as
they accrue2 2 despite policy language providing that this duty does
not arise until final adjudication of the underlying claims against
the insured. 23 This timing issue arises because attorneys' fees and
expenses usually come due before final adjudication,2 and because
one cannot immediately determine whether the cost of the defense
25
will ultimately fall within policy coverage.
While some jurisdictions have held that the standard D & 0 policy
requires the insurer to reimburse defense costs 26 as they accrue,"2

insuring clause, the insurer agrees to pay on behalf of each director or officer any
loss (as the term is defined in the policy) arising from claims made against them
by reason of any wrongful act (as the term is defined in the policy) committed
in their respective capacities of directors or officers. See Johnston, supra note 1,
at 2015.
19. See J. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 72 (1971) [hereinafter KEETON]. These
provisions include such clauses as the "option" clause, the "no action" clause and
the "consent to costs" clause. See generally Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at
339-40.
20. The dilemma arises because the D & 0 insuring clause seems to indicate
that payments will be made as losses are incurred, while the option clause seems
to require disbursement only after adjudication. For a lucid description of the
dilemma, see Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (W.D. Pa.
1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
21. For an analysis of the components of the typical D & 0 insurance policy,
see Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 337-40. Lloyd's D & 0 policy is the one
most widely used. See Practical Aspects, supra note 1, at 699 n.83; Corporate
Executives, supra note 12, at 649-50.
22. In this Note, the phrase "as they accrue" is synonymous with "as incurred"
when describing the payment of legal expenses.
23. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2; Johnston, supra note 1, at
2023; Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 337.
24. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D.
Haw. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 795 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986)).
25. See Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 338. The typical D & 0 policy
contains several important statutory exclusions and some "non-standard" exclusions,
added to the policy by the insurers, which limit coverage. See Johnston, supra
note 1, at 2017. One particularly popular exclusion, the "dishonesty exclusion,"
excludes liability "with respect to claims brought about or contributed to by the
dishonesty of the insureds ......
Id. at 2019. Usually, however, a claimant's
dishonesty is not established until adjudication. Consequently, insurers prefer to
cover defense costs after a final adjudication and not on an "as incurred" basis.
26. "Defense costs" is not entirely synonymous with "legal expenses." For
purposes of this Note, however, the terms are used interchangeably.
27. See Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Haw. 1985),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 795 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986); Pepsico, Inc. v.
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others have held that the insurer has the right to await a final
adjudication. 28 Each view has widely divergent consequences. The
former redounds to the detriment of insurers, 29 while the latter works
against insureds and the institutions they represent.3 0 In resolving
such a contractual dilemma, courts examine the plain meaning of
the policy language," rules of contract interpretation3 2 and principles
of unconscionability. 3
In the Southern District of New York, a recent case, Pepsico,
Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. i4 held that the D & 0 insurance
carrier was obligated to pay the insured's costs as they accrue,35
subject to reimbursement should adjudication show that there were
no grounds for coverage. 6
This Note proposes that the Pepsieo rule favoring the insured is
the more judicious view regarding interim payments. Part Ii discusses

Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. SUpp. 656, 659-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Little v.
MOIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1465 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d
789 (3d Cir. 1987).
28. See Clandening v. MGIC Indem. Corp., No. CV 83-2432 (C.D. Cal. May
24, 1983); California Chiropractic Ass'n v. CNA Ins. Co., No. C-579-326 (Sup.
Ct. Los Angeles County June 26, 1986); Enzweiler v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., No.
85-99 (E.D. Ky. May 13, 1986); Luther v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., No. 85-2762Civ.-JWK (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 1986); First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. MGIC
Indem. Corp., No. 32-2121 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 1982); Citizens State Bank v. MGIC
Indem. Corp., No. L-050357-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 28, 1985); Bank
of Commerce & Trust Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 474,
476-77 (N.D. Okla. 1986).
29. For a discussion of the woes confronting insurers in the face of the former
view, see PracticalAspects, supra note 1, at 714 n.163 (given time value of money
insurer would rather pay later than sooner; also, insurer risks loss if he advances
defense costs to non-covered director).
30. The detrimental impact on insureds of defense cost reimbursement at the
conclusion of trial is noted in Johnston, supra note 1, at 1993-94.
31. See Omaha Indem. Co. v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 215
(D.C.N.Y. 1984); Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 570
F. Supp. 870 (D.C.N.Y. 1983); In re Estate of Olson, 447 Pa. 483, 488, 291 A.2d
95, 98 (1972) (quoting Orner v. T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 401 Pa. 195, 199,
163 A.2d 880, 883 (1960)); Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 453, 457, 233 A.2d 548, 551 (1967).
32. See Okada, 795 F.2d at 1453-55; Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1463; Pepsico,
640 F. Supp. at 659-60; Mohn v. American Casualty Co., 458 Pa. 576, 586, 326
A.2d 346, 351 (1974).
33. See Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins., 503 Pa. 300,
307, 469 A.2d 563, 567 (1983); Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 495 Pa. 540, 551, 434
A.2d 1222, 1228 (1981) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
34. 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
35. Id. at 659-60.
36. Id.at 660.
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the differing interpretations of D & 0 policy defense cost clauses.
Part III puts forth the Pepsico rule, a view in support of the insured.
Part IV analyzes the Pepsico rule from the standpoints of reasonable
expectations, contract interpretation and unconscionability, and, after
comparing D & 0 insurance with standard liability insurance, recommends adoption ot the Pepsico rule in other jurisdictions.
II.

Differing Interpretations of Defense Cost Clauses

Case law on the timing of insurance disbursement falls along two
lines: that which obligates the insurer to pay the defense costs as
incurred (the pro-insured argument), and that which grants the insurer
the right to await a final adjudication (the pro-insurer argument).3 7
A.

The Pro-Insured Argument

In Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp. ," the defendant, an insurance
company, issued a D & 0 liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs,
insured directors and officers of First Savings and Loan.3 9 The
plaintiffs, defendants in two underlying cases4° wherein they were
41
alleged to have caused First Savings and Loan to become insolvent,
sought a declaratory judgment to construe the terms of the D & 0
policy. 42 At issue was whether MGIC Indemnity Corporation (MGIC)
had to pay the attorneys' fees of the plaintiffs as incurred.4 3 MGIC's
primary argument was that the option clause of the D & 0 insurance
policy relieved it of the duty to advance legal expenses. 44 This
provision reserved for the insurer the option to advance defense
costs to the insured. 45 The District Court of Hawaii held that the

37. "The pro-insured argument" and "the pro-insurer argument"
created for this Note.

are terms

38. 608 F. Supp. 383 (D. Haw. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 795 F.2d
1450 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 385.
40. The two underlying suits were FLSIC v. Alexander, 590 F. Supp. 834 (D.

Haw. 1984), and First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander, 558 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Haw.
1983). Okada, 608 F. Supp. at 385.

41. Id.
42. Id. A party seeks declaratory relief to obtain a declaration of rights so that
he understands what he can and cannot legally do. See D. DoBBS, REmEDIES 26
(West 1973).
43. See Okada, 608 F. Supp. at 385.

44. See id. at 386.
45. Section 5(c) of the policy contained the following provision:
The insurer may at its option and upon request, advance on behalf of
the [d]irectors and [o]fficers, or any of them, expenses which they have
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option clause was inconsistent with the definition of loss in the
policy, 46 thus creating an ambiguity which, under Hawaii law, was
to be construed against the drafter/insurer.4 7 The court added that
a D & 0 insurance policy like the one described by MGIC would
4
be virtually impossible to vend to reasonable directors and officers
and that an insurance policy "should be construed according to the
reasonable expectations of the insured." ' 49 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that MGIC was obligated
to pay plaintiff's defense costs as they came due.5 0
In Little v. MGIC Indemnity Corp.," the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ruled against the
defendant insurance company using a similar rationale. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh (UNB) purchased a D & 0 policy for
the benefit of its directors and officers. 2 The policy was issued by
MGIC Indemnity Corporation (MGIC). Beginning in 1983, UNB
was named as a defendant in several lawsuits brought by five other
institutions.14 James P. Little (Little), vice-president of UNB's commercial loan department, was named as a third-party defendant in
each of the lawsuits. 5 MGIC refused to advance defense costs to
incurred in connection with claims made against them, prior to disposition
of such claims, provided always that in the event it is finally established
the [i]nsurer has no liability hereunder, such [dlirectors and [ojfficers
agree to repay to the [ilnsurer, upon demand, all monies advanced by
virtue of this provision.
Id.(emphasis added),
46. Id. Section I(d) of the policy defines "loss" as follows:
The term "[lioss" shall mean any amount which the [dlirectors and
[o]fficers are legally obligated to pay or for which the [a]ssociation is
required to indemnify the [d]irectors or [o]fficers ... for a claim or

claims made against the [dlirectors and [o]fficers for [wlrongful [a]cts
and shall include but not be limited to damages, judgments, settlements,
costs . . . and defense of legal actions ....

Id.at 385.
The court noted an additional ambiguity in the policy-between § 5(c), supra
note 45, and § 5(a). Section 5(a) provides in pertinent part: "No costs, charges
and expenses shall be incurred or settlements made without the [i]nsurer's consent
...." Okada, 608 F. Supp. at 386.

47. See id.
48. See id.at 387.

49. Id.(citing Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 67 Haw. 203, 210, 684
P.2d 960, 964 (1984)).
50. See Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 795 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. 649 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
52. Id.at 1461.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 1462. For a list of the underlying suits, see id. at 1462 n.1.
55. Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1461-62 (W.D. Pa. 1986),
aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Little, arguing that the D & 0 policy provided the insurer the option
to advance such costs at its discretion.16 Little, consequently, sought
a declaratory judgment ordering MGIC to pay the defense costs
associated with the other lawsuits.1 7 The court herd that because the
language of the D & 0 policy was ambiguous58 MGIC was obligated
to pay Little's defense costs in the underlying suits as those costs
were incurred. 9 Under Pennsylvania law, ambiguities are resolved
61
against the insurer. ° The court, therefore, held for the plaintiff.
The court further proffered that even if the language of the D &
O policy unambiguously granted the insurer an absolute option to
withhold defense costs until a final adjudication, such a provision
would be unconscionable under Pennsylvania law. 62 This is because
"it leaves the insured no meaningful choice in the matter ... he
has no real alternative even though the cost of defense may bankrupt
him,''63 and "it is unreasonably favorable to the insurers, who may
blithely disclaim responsibility for the insured's enormous financial
burdens while the insured must fight on."6
B.

The Pro-Insurer Argument

Other jurisdictions hold that the standard D & 0 policy does not
obligate the insurer to pay defense costs as incurred.6 5 In Luther v.

56. Id. at 1462.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1469.
59. The court noted the following ambiguities:
There are two ambiguous parts to the D & 0 policy ... [s]ubsection
5(C) creates confusion by seeming to absolve the insurer from its duty
to pay reasonable defense costs contained in [s]ubsection 5(A) ....
Another ambiguity is apparent when [s]ection 3(A)(5) is read in conjunction with [slection 5.
Id. at 1465.
60. See Mohn v. American Casualty Co., 458 Pa. 576, 586, 326 A.2d 346, 351
(1974).
61. Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1466, 1469 (W.D. Pa.
1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
62. See id. at 1468.
63. Id. There are three reasons why the insured has no choice but to accept
the coverage offered him. First, the exposure to tremendous liability generates an
urgent need for some kind of D & 0 coverage. See infra notes 121-27 and
accompanying text. Second, the small market for D & 0 insurance limits opportunity
to shop for bargains. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Third, standardization of D & 0 policy provisions renders the existence of alternative insurers
moot. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
64. Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1648.
65. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Fidelity & Deposit Co.,66 for example, the court refused to force
an insurance carrier to pay insured directors and officers interim
payments 67 for their defense costs. 68 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida found that the policy's option
clause, the crux of the dispute, was plain and unambiguous on its
face.6 9 It undeniably granted the insurer an option to advance payments to the insured.70 Consequently, the policy required no special
7
construction or interpretation. 1
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Education,72 insured
members of the Charles County Board of Education sought construction of a D & 0 insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty
Company (CCC).73 Although the issues before the court did not
specifically include the "as incurred" question,7 4 the court did discuss
the validity of the policy's option clause. 7 After a detailed analysis
of the D & 0 policy, 76 the majority noted that the clause's language
gave CCC "the option, but not the obligation" to disburse payments
for legal costs as incurred.7 7 The court found support for its position
in the plain meaning of the option clause language78 and one com-

66. No. 85-2762-Civ.-JWK (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 1986).

67. See supra note 8.
68. Luther v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., No. 85-2762-Civ.-JWK (S.D. Fla. Aug.

15, 1986); see also Clandening v. MGIC Indem. Corp., No. CV 83-2432 (C.D.
Cal. May 24, 1983).
69. "The language contained therein clearly reflects that [the insurer], if it so
chooses, may advance expenses .

..

[but] is not obligated to do so .

. . ."

Luther

v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., No. 85-2762-Civ.-JWK (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 1986) (emphasis
added).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. 302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985).
73. Id. at 520, 489 A.2d at 538.
74. The court of appeals considered five certified questions, none of which
specifically concerned whether the insurer must disburse D & 0 insurance payments
on an "as incurred" basis. See id. at 531-37, 489 A.2d at 543-47.
75. The policy contained the typical option clause language. Id. at 522, 489
A.2d at 539. See infra note 78 for the pertinent text of the option clause. For
further discussion of option clauses in general, see Oettle & Howard, supra note
1, at 339-40.
76. See Continental, 302 Md. at 520-22, 489 A.2d at 538-39.
77. Id. at 530, 489 A.2d at 543 (emphasis added).
78. The option clause contained the following provision:
(b) The [ilnsurer may at its option and upon request, advance on behalf
of an [a]ssured . .. fees, costs and expenses which have been incurred
in connection with claims made against an [a]ssured, prior to disposition
of such claims, provided always that, in the event it is finally established
the [i]nsurer has no liability hereunder, each agrees to repay to the
[ilnsurer, upon demand, all monies advanced on their behalf pursuant
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mentator's description of D & 0 insurance: "Under D & 0 policies
the insured must provide its defense, although the insurer may
participate at its [own] option . . .,,9
In Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co.,80 the insureds sought declaratory relief concerning a
D & 0 insurance policy. 8 The United States District Court of
Oklahoma denied both parties' motion for summary judgment, holding that there were "genuine issues of material fact to be resolved." 8 2
8
Although the court did not decide the "as incurred" issue explicitly,
it did observe that a final adjudication in the underlying suit could
84
show that the directors and officers were disqualified from coverage.
Accordingly, this case stands for the proposition that coverage for
defense costs is a function of underlying claims.85 Because coverage
cannot be established absolutely until a final adjudication of the
underlying claims,8 6 it would appear, under the view espoused in
Bank of Commerce, that an insurer has no obligation to reimburse
87
the insured's defense costs as incurred.
In Enzweiler v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,88 the District Court of
Kentucky was more explicit. In Enzweiler, Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) issued a D & 0 policy to Ervin Enzweiler
(Enzweiler), president of Northern Kentucky Bank & Trust
(Northern).8 9 Enzweiler became involved in a number of suits arising
out of his conduct as president of Northern, and sought a declaratory
judgment as to whether Fidelity was required to make payments
under the D & 0 policy. 90 The court held that the insurance company
could elect to await the outcome of the underlying claims against

to this provision.
Id. at 522, 489 A.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 530, 489 A.2d at 543 (citing W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFrlCERS AND DmECTORS ch. 20 (3d ed. 1978)).
80. 651 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Okla. 1986).
81. Id. at 475. For an explanation of declaratory relief, see supra note 42.
82. Bank of Commerce, 651 F. Supp. at 476.
83. The court noted that the "as incurred" issue remained moot until it was
determined whether the insured's alleged actions fell within the policy's coverage.
Id. at 476-77.
84. See id. at 476.
85. See id.; see also Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 343.
86. See Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 344.
87. It is impossible to permit the insurer to await a final adjudication on the
one hand, and obligate him to pay costs as incurred on the other.
88. Civ. No. 85-99 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Enzweiler before advancing any payments. 9' While placing emphasis
on the plain meaning of the option clause provision in the D & 0
policy, 92 the court also reasoned that the judgment in the underlying
actions "may be such that there is no coverage." 93
III.

The Pepsico Rule

In Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., the Southern District
of New York adopted a position similar to that of the "pro-insured"
jurisdictions. The decision obligates insurers to pay an insured's
defense costs as incurred, 94 but stipulates, however, that such payments are made subject to reimbursement 95 should final adjudication
show that there were no grounds for coverage. 96
In Pepsico, plaintiff Pepsico, Inc. (Pepsico) purchased a D & 0
insurance policy from Continental Casualty Company (Continental). 97
Pepsico sought to recover from Continental money paid in litigation
involving Pepsico's directors and officers. 9 Pepsico argued that Continental had a duty to pay the defense costs to the directors and
officers on an "as incurred" basis. 99 Continental countered that it
was not liable to pay the legal fees until final adjudication because
there remained the possibility that a final adjudication would reveal
that the directors and officers had disqualified themselves from
coverage.100 Consequently, Continental moved to dismiss the complaint. 101

91. Id.
92. See id. at 1.
93. Id.
94. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). For a discussion of the pro-insured argument, see supra notes 38-64 and
accompanying text. There are relatively few decided cases on point, but Pepsico
clearly and concisely sets out the rule.
95. See Pepsico, 640 F. Supp. at 659.
96. Insurers frequently raise the possibility that the recipients of the insurance
payments are not covered by the policy. See Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649
F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987). This
argument is referred to as the "no-coverage objection."
97. Pepsico, 640 F. Supp. at 657.
98. Id.

99. Id.at 658.
100. Paragraph IVb(5) of the D & 0 policy excluded coverage for payments
"brought about or contributed to by the dishonesty of the [d]irectors or [o]fficers."
Id.at 659.
101. Id.at 657.
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The court held that the D & 0 policy language did not excuse
10 2
Continental from its obligation to pay the defense costs as incurred.
The court looked primarily to the plain meaning of the terms of
the D & 0 policy,103 which contained, inter alia, a dishonesty exclusion clause." °4 Nowhere in the policy, the court observed, was
entry of final judgment made a prerequisite to payment of defense
costs. 105 Furthermore, according to the D & 0 policy definition of
loss'0 6 the insurer's duty to pay all defense costs attached once the
directors and officers were legally obligated to pay them. 0 7 It then
08
became incumbent upon Continental to confine its duty to pay,1
which it could do "only if it could establish as a matter of law
that there was no possible factual basis on which it might be obligated
to indemnify the directors and officers."' ° Since Pepsico's directors
were "legally obligated to pay" their legal expenses "as incurred,"
Continental was required to cover this loss on an "as incurred"
basis. 110
IV.

Courts Should Adopt the Pepsico Rule

The Pepsico rule is justified on the grounds of reasonable expectations, rules of contract interpretation and principles of unconscionability."' Furthei, alternative support for the rule is found by
2
analogizing D & 0 insurance to standard liability insurance."1
A.

The Parties' Reasonable Expectations
Where possible, the words of an insurance policy are to be given
their plain, ordinary meaning." 3 This rule, derived from the linguistic
102. Id. at 659. The court also noted that Continental would be entitled to
reimbursement should final adjudication show that no coverage existed in the first
place. Id.
103. See id. at 660-61.
104. "The policy excludes coverage for any payments 'brought about or contributed to by the dishonesty of the [d]irectors or [oifficers.' "Id. at 659.
105. Id.
106. "Loss shall mean any amount which the [d]irectors and [olfficers are legally
obligated to pay . . . [including] amounts incurred in the defense of legal actions,
claims or proceedings and appeals therefrom ....
" Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 660.
109. Id. (citing Villa Charlotte Bronte, Inc. v. Commercial Union, 64 N.Y.2d
846, 848, 476 N.E.2d 640, 642, 487 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (1985)).
110. The Okada court made the same point. See Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp.,
608 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Haw. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 795 F.2d 1450
(9th Cir. 1986).
111. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 172-93 and accompanying text.
113. See C. Raymond Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 467 F.
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is concisely summed up by

' 5
Professor Wigmore: "You cannot disturb a plain meaning." "
From judicial regulation of adhesion contracts, 16 however, emerges

one broad principle: "The objectively reasonable expectations of

applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.""17 This
doctrine puts forth an objective method of achieving equity between
insurer and insured." 8 It signifies that the standard for policy interpretation is that of the layman, not the sophisticated underwriter."l 9
The crucial question to be resolved, therefore, is whether a D & 0
policyholder could reasonably expect defense costs to be underwritten
as incurred.12 0
A director's legal costs can be enormous, 2' and his legal battles
can last for years. 2 2 Directors are exposed to the possibility of
defense costs "far in excess of anything that has been experienced
historically."' 12a According to a 1982 Wyatt Company D & 0 insurance survey, 124 for example, the average total cost per policy claim
amounted to $365,O000.25 Even claims that were eventually dropped

Supp. 17, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (citing Easton v. Washington County Ins. Co., 391
Pa. 28, 137 A.2d 332 (1958)).
114. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461, at 197 (1983).

115. Id.
116. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract form offered to consumers
without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979). For the origin of the term see Patterson, The Delivery
of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
117. KEETON, supra note 19, at 351 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. See id.; see also Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 86970, 377 P.2d 284, 288-89, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176-77 (1962).
120. See Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1465-66, aff'd, 836
F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
121. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Little, 649 F. Supp. at

1468; J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION
AND INSURANCE
1.01 (1981).
122. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974), a D & 0 liability suit that exemplifies the indeterminate amount
of time during which a director may be forced to cover his defense costs, generated
six years of legal fees. See Knepper, An Overview of D & 0 Liability for Insurance
Company Directors and Officers, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 63 (1978).
123. Johnston, supra note 1, at 1993.
124. The Wyatt Company is a consulting firm specializing in pension plans,
actuarial evaluations, risk management, employee benefits and executive compensation. See Practical Aspects, supra note 1, at 692.
125. See id. at 694 (citing THE WYATT COMPANY, 1982 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT:
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY/ FIDUCIARY LIABILITY 14 (1982)).
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cost directors an average of $70,000 in legal expenses. 2 6 Clearly,
the threat of potentially crippling legal costs is the primary reason
27
directors obtain D & 0 liability insurance.
In fact, the only notice a policyholder might have that he may
be forced to underwrite his entire defense is the language of the
option clause in the D & 0 policy, 128 a clause often cited in opinions
for its ambiguity and vagueness. 2 9 Certainly, the split of authority
on the clarity of the clause is some indication that the option clause
language is less than clear. 30
A D & 0 policyholder, therefore, would reasonably expect defense
costs to be underwritten as incurred.' Indeed, a D & 0 policy that
provided otherwise "would not truly protect the individual from
financial harm.'1 2 It would leave the insured in an extremely vulnerable position,' as few directors are likely to possess the resources
to sustain such costs.'3 4 Consequently, a reasonable director or officer
would almost never purchase a D & 0 policy that did not cover
legal costs as incurred."

B.

Rules of Contract Interpretation
Ordinary rules of contract interpretation also demonstrate the

validity of the Pepsico rule. 3 6 Most insurance policy provisions are
drafted by the insurer.' 37 If a provision in an insurance contract is

ambiguous, or inconsistent with another provision, it is construed
in favor of the insured and against the insurer.' 8 The primary

126. See Practical Aspects, supra note 1, at 694.
127. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2.
128. See supra note 45 for the typical option clause language.
129. See, e.g., Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1465, aff'd,
836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987); Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 383,
387 (D. Haw. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 795 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986);
Okada, 795 F.2d at 1453-54.
130. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1466.
131. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
132. Okada, 608 F. Supp. at 387.
133. See id.; Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1468-69; Practical Aspects, supra note 1,
at 691 ("uneasy lies the corporate head unprotected by a solid D & 0 policy").
134. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 1993.
135. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1466; Okada, 608 F. Supp. at 387.
136. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
137. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 350.
138. See Westchester Resco Co., L.P. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 818
F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987); Stern v. Satra Corp., 539 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1976); Van
Ekris & Stoett, Inc. v. S.S. Rio Paraguay, 573 F. Supp. 1475 (D.C.N.Y. 1983),
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rationale is that purchasers of insurance generally possess a less than
complete mastery of the nuances of their policy' a9 and therefore
should be protected from "the fine print" of long and complicated
forms. 140

This is no less true in the case of purchasers of D & 0 insurance.
D & 0 policies granting the insurer an option to withhold defense
costs until adjudication, i.e., policies with the typical option clause,
are often found to contain ambiguous or conflicting clauses.14 ' This
is due to the problematic nature of a policy construction favoring
the insurer-i.e., finding that an insured's accruing defense costs
are not "losses" under the. policy142-and a perceptible attempt by
the courts to "do equity" by straining to find ambiguities in D &
O policies.'

4

Insurers contend, however, that directors are sufficiently intelligent
to recognize policy ambiguities on their face.'" Purchasers of D &
O insurance, insurers argue, are more sophisticated than the average
consumer in bargaining for insurance coverage. 145 At least one court
has found, however, that directors require the same judicial protection from policy ambiguities as ordinary consumers.' 46 Indeed,
the doctrine of construing ambiguities against the drafter is "more
rigorously applied in insurance than in other contracts, in recognition
aff'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 608
F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Haw. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 795 F.2d 1450
(9th Cir. 1986); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 761 (3d Cir. 1985);
Allen Spooner & Son. Inc. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 753, 755 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963); Mohn v. American Cas. Co., 458 Pa.
576, 586, 326 A.2d 346, 351 (1974); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,
269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966). This is known as the
doctrine of contra proferentem. See W. YOUNG & E. HOLMES, INSURANCE 56-65
(2d ed. 1985).
139. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 351-52.
140. See id.
141. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
142. One commentator illustrates this problem in a discussion of the Okada
court's reasoning:
[Loss] is defined to include "any amount which the [dlirectors and
[ojfficers are legally obligated to pay .... ." The court reasoned that
the insured is "legally obligated to pay" defense costs as they come due
(in the sense that the insured's counsel has submitted a bill). Thus, the
court concluded, a "loss" covered by the policy is sustained at the time
defense costs are incurred.
Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 347.
143. See 11 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 44:6 (rev. ed. 1982); KEETON,
supra note 19, at 356.
144. See Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1469 (W.D. Pa.
1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
145. See id.
146. See id.
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of the difference between the parties in their acquaintance with the
subject matter. "141
C.

Unconscionability

Can an insurer escape the noose of the Pepsico rule by including
in its D & 0 policy an unambiguous, clear provision disclaiming
obligation to pay on an "as incurred" basis? If the D & 0 policy
is unambiguous the court must give effect to that language. 48 Therefore, justification for deviating from unambiguous D & 0 policy
language lies only in principles of unconscionability, 149 which ensure
that an insurer will not be permitted an unconscionable advantage
in an insurance transaction despite fully informed consent on the
part of the insured. 50 The crucial question, then, is whether it would
be unconscionable to force policyholders to underwrite their own
legal defense costs for an indeterminate period of time. 5 '
The basic test of unconscionability is whether the clauses involved
in the D & 0 policy are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly
surprise the other party. 15 2 That is, does the standard D & 0 policy
include: (1) an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties; and (2) terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party?'
D & 0 policies are contracts of adhesion. 154 An insurer generally
offers a limited range of insurance forms'55 and the purchaser must

147. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.)

(emphasis added), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
148. See New York v. Home Indem. Co., 106 A.D.2d 124, 483 N.Y.S.2d 834
(3d Dep't), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 669, 486 N.E.2d 827, 495 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1985);
Jewish Bd. of Family and Children's Servs., Inc. v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d
710, 487 N.E.2d 283, 496 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1985). See generally 4 S. WILISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 602A, at 325-34 (3d ed.

1961).

149. See Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins., 503 Pa. 300,
307, 469 A.2d 563, 567 (1983) (citing 13 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2302) (court may
refuse enforcement of contract or particular clause if unconscionable at time of
drafting); Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 348.
150. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 348.
151. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1468.
152. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 406 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
CALAMARI & PERILLO]. The concept of unconscionability has entered the general
law of contracts. Id.at 403.
153. Id.at 407.
154. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 350. "There has been increasing recognition
...that the bargaining process has become more limited in modern society ....
[The consumer faced with an adhesion contract] has no real choice. He must take
that form or leave it." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 152, at 6.
155. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 73.
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accept one if he desires coverage. 56 The major advantage this offers
the insurer is economy of operations.' 57 By drafting standardized

insurance policies insurers avoid the cost of negotiating insurance
on a policy-by-policy basis.' 58 Insurers contend that the public also
benefits from standardization. 5 9 The standardized policy is developed
from experience, they argue, and is therefore a fair approximation
of a policyholder's needs.'16
An insured, nonetheless, has "little choice beyond electing among

standardized provisions offered to him.''

1

Standardized provisions,

62
though, limit the "scope of choice" of the insurance purchaser.
Essentially, there exists an inequality in bargaining power between
vendors and purchasers of insurance policies. 63 Purchasers of D &

O insurance

"have no more leverage than the ordinary person who

deals with insurance companies"' 64 because they also cannot bargain
for the terms of the policy. 65 The insured, therefore, faces an absence
66
of meaningful choice when purchasing D & 0 liability insurance.
Furthermore, a D & 0 policy that grants the insurer an absolute
option to withhold defense costs is unreasonably favorable to the
insurer. 67 The insurer could defer all payments until adjudication;' 68
this is usually for an indeterminate amount of time. 69 Moreover,
the D & 0 policy would allow the insurer the luxury of deferring
payments in virtually every case. 70 Finally, the policy would prove

quite unfavorable to the insured, as it would leave him in a financially
156. See id.
157. See id. at 69.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 350. The bargaining process with regard to adhesion contracts "is
not one of haggle or cooperative process but rather of a fly and flypaper." CALAMARI
& PERLLO, supra note 152, at 6 (quoting Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L.
REV.

131, 143 (1970)).

162. See KEETON, supra note 19, at 69.
163. See id. at 348; see also Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire
Ins., 503 Pa. 300, 304, 469 A.2d 563, 567 (1983).
164. Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1460, 1469 (W.D. Pa. 1986),
aff'd, 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
165. See id.; see also KEETON, supra note 19, at 72-73.
166. The small number of insurers willing to carry D & 0 insurance exacerbates
the absence of meaningful choice. See supra note 16 and -accompanying text.
167. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also PracticalAspects, supra
note 1, at 714 n.163.
168. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1468; Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2;
Johnston, supra note 1, at 2023; Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 340.
169. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
170. See Little, 649 F. Supp. at 1468-69.
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vulnerable position.' 71 Considerations of unconscionability dictate,
therefore, that an insurer should be required to cover legal expenses
as incurred.
D.

Analogy to Standard Liability Policies

Pepsico serves as a valid basis for requiring insurers to cover an
insured's defense costs as incurred. Given the reluctance of some
73
courts to utilize reasonable expectations, 7 2 contra proferentem1
and
174
7
5
unconscionability
to establish a pro-insured holding,
however,

further, alternative support can be found by analogy to standard
liability policies.

176

Standard liability policies differ from D & 0 insurance policies
in that they impose a duty upon the insurer to defend its insureds.177
D & 0 policies, by contrast, are indemnification policies. They impose
upon the insurer a duty to pay the costs of the defense of the
7
insured.'1
Accordingly, standard liability policies do not generate
the "as incurred" problem standard D & 0 policies do. 7 9 More
interestingly, however, the insured under a standard liability policy
enjoys the benefits of an insurer-provided defense despite the possibility of an ultimate determination that coverage under the policy
never existed. 80
Despite the fact D & 0 policies have been traditionally regarded
as indemnification policies,'8 ' jurisdictions today should construe

171. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The insured's travails are compounded by the fact corporate defense lawyers do not work under contingency
arrangements, whereas counsel for stockholder plaintiffs usually do. See Practical
Aspects, supra note 1, at 691.
172. See supra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 148-71 and accompanying text.
175. A pro-insured holding is one requiring insurers to disburse payments for
an insured's legal expenses as these are incurred. See supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
176. For an overview of the different components of a standard liability policy,
see generally LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 18.
177. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2. This is commonly referred
to as the duty to defend. See generally Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 34243.
178. See Goldstein & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2.
179. See id. This is because where there are no payments made to the insured
there is no timing issue concerning such payments. See also supra notes 20-25 and
accompanying text.
180. See Oettle & Howard, supra note 1, at 343. For an explanation of the nocoverage objection, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
181. See Corporate Executives, supra note 12 (the D & 0 insuring clause suggests
that the policy provides indemnity rather than liability coverage).
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them as liability policies, imposing a duty to defend upon D & 0
insurers.
Logically, there is little substantive difference between a defense
provided by the insurer (a liability policy construction) and one
financed by payments disbursed by the insurer (an indemnification
policy construction). In both instances the net result is that the
insured is not forced to sustain the potentially enormous costs of
financing a defense.' 8 2 Furthermore, in both instances it is the insurer
that provides the defense; only the method of provision differs.'8 3
In fact, the only real difference between an insured's defense under
a liability policy and one under a D & 0 policy is that under the
D & 0 policy the insurer can, in effect, deny any defense to the
insured, even where the plaintiff's complaint reveals that the insured
may have coverage.8 4 This would be clearly impermissible if D &
O policies were construed as liability policies.
Indeed, there is a judicial tendency toward reading such indemnity
policies as standard liability policies.' 85 According to one commentator, even Lloyd's D & 0 policy, 8 6 with its clear language to
provide indemnity coverage only, "would probably be construed as
liability rather than indemnity insurance."'18 7 This is because of the
"selfish" nature of indemnity contracts, as well as the insurer's
obligation to pay "losses" incurred by the insured:
In the first place, the definition of "loss" includes "judgments"
as well as "payments."... It is well established that a covenant
to pay "judgments'.' rendered against an insured signifies that the
policy is intended to provide liability rather than indemnity cov88
erage.

182. See supra notes 6, 121-27 and accompanying text.
183. It is the different method of providing a defense in D & 0 policies that
generates the "as incurred" problem. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying
text.
184. By utilizing the no-coverage objection, see supra note 96, an insurer can
disclaim payment on an "as incurred" basis. If there is then an adjudication that
precludes an insured from coverage, the insurer can refuse to pay the costs of the
defense. The net result is that the insurer has denied the insured a defense.
185. See Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Faison, 22 N.Y.2d 554, 240 N.E.2d 34, 293
N.Y.S.2d 538 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1055 (1969); Corporate Executives,
supra note 12, at 651-53. Such a reading, if valid, would impose the duty to
defend, ordinarily found in standard liability policies, on D & 0 insurers. See
generally supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 13-14, 21 and accompanying text.
187. Corporate Executives, supra note 12, at 652.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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If D & 0 policies are read as liability policies, as they should be, 8 9
D & 0 insurers necessarily have a duty to defend. In insurance law,
a duty to defend arises when the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint even arguably reveal that the insured might have coverage.' 9°
Under such a construction, then, the "as incurred" problem disappears, as a D & 0 insurer could not be permitted to await a
final adjudication without breaching its duty. The D & 0 insurer
would have to pay its insured's defense costs as incurred.
The similarity between an insurer-provided defense and one financed by the insurer, as well as the tendency toward reading D &
O policies as standard liability policies, 9' leads to the conclusion
that D & 0 insurers have a "duty to defend' '1 92 their insureds. The
practical implication of this duty is that D & 0 insurers cannot be
permitted to deny their insureds a defense, which is precisely what
they do when disclaiming a duty to pay an insured's legal costs on
an "as incurred" basis. 193 The weight of the analogy dictates, therefore, that D & 0 insurers have a duty to pay an insured's legal
costs on an "as incurred" basis.
V.

Conclusion

Jurisdictions differ in the interpretation of D & 0 policy defense
cost clauses. The Pepsico rule requires an insurance carrier to disburse
insurance money to cover an insured's legal expenses as they accrue,
subject to reimbursement should adjudication show that there were
no grounds for coverage. Such a rule comports with the reasonable
expectations of the insured and is consistent with rules of contract
interpretation and principles of unconscionability. The rule also finds
support by analogizing D & 0 policies to standard liability policies.
Courts should therefore adopt the Pepsico standard requiring D &
0 insurers to disburse payments as legal costs are incurred by
directors and officers.
Arthur P. Xanthos

189. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text; CorporateExecutives, supra
note 12.

190. See Westchester Resco Co., L.P. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 818
F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
191. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
192. See id.
193. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.

